The objection that became the feature
Reframing a risk is honest only after the work of reducing it is done.
Turn a perceived risk into an asset.
Mint asked people to hand the logins for their bank and credit card accounts to a startup nobody had heard of. When Aaron Patzer went looking for investors, around fifty turned him down, and the reason was nearly always the same: no one would trust a new company with their finances. The objection was reasonable. It was also, as Patzer explained to CBS MoneyWatch in 2009, the thing he ended up selling.
His answer had two parts. The first was to shrink the risk itself. Mint did not ask for names or addresses at signup, it connected to banks with read-only access so no money could be moved, and it did not keep account numbers. The second part is the one in the line. Because Mint could see all of a user’s accounts at once, it could spot an odd charge or a strange spending pattern sooner than any single bank, and send an alert. Access that looked like a danger became a reason to sign up.
The move generalizes. A product too plain for power users can be sold as the one that needs no training. A company too small to serve large customers can promise that a founder answers the phone. A marketplace with few sellers can present each one as chosen by hand. In each case the founder takes a doubt the buyer already has and shows the benefit that comes from the same fact.
What keeps the tactic honest is the order of Patzer’s two steps. He reduced the risk before he started talking about its upside. A founder who skips that step is doing public relations on a real danger. Had Mint handled credentials carelessly, the fraud-alert pitch would have been a way of distracting users from the thing that could hurt them.
The reframe also has to hold up from the customer’s side, whatever it sounds like in a pitch. Mint’s alerts were a real service that many banks did not offer well at the time. Compare a laptop maker whose machine has short battery life calling it “lightweight”: if the weight saved is trivial and the battery complaint is serious, the reframing insults the buyer, and the buyer notices.
Some risks cannot be reframed at all. A drug with a serious side effect or a financial product that can wipe out savings calls for a different response: reduce the danger and say plainly what remains. Presenting that kind of risk as a selling point is how a clever pitch ends up in court.
Mint’s own record suggests the idea works when both halves are real. The service signed up more than a hundred thousand users in its first four months without a breach, and Intuit bought it in 2009. The risk investors saw was real, and so was the protection the product offered. The asset existed only because both were true.